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Lacan's (K)not-Politics

For Lacan, our de facto social constructs are centered around a symbolic order that is constituted by lack. In Lacan's account of the Oedipal complex, narrative is myth insofar as it is the discursive form of that which cannot be transmitted through the definition of truth--thus we do not find knowledge of the subject in myths. This mythologizing of the Oedipal complex is what ultimately leads Lacan to reject the Freudian notion of the unconscious as regulatory. Furthermore, in Lacan's later work, the father is not only (as symbolic) the agent of frustration of the infant's desire, but is himself also humiliated and castrated—hence Lacan's preference for Moses and Monotheism over Totem and Taboo. Myth is created in order to relate the subject to the law, which generates both identity and normative social rules. While Freud's account of the unconscious appears to ascribe to it subjectivity, Lacan's does not for the very reason that the regulatory aspect of subjectivity conceals its constitutive lack.

Lacanianians have tended to critique Derrida for his account of undecidability, but this charge may actually be more relevant to Lacan himself, since the Law (of the Father) is always without true authority. This paper will consider the relation between the decision and the knotting of the Lacanian unconscious. In Seminar 19, Lacan issues a warning against the valorization of fraternity reminiscent of Derrida's in *Politics of Friendship*, and in the sequel, he turns to the link between Judeo-Christian monotheism and the problem of sexualization. It could be suggested that this produces a psychoanalytic counterpart to Schmitt's political theology and decisionism.